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Club Vista Financial Servs. v. Dist. Ct., 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 21 (May 17, 2012)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE – DEPOSITION OF OPPOSING PARTY’S FORMER ATTORNEY
Summary
The Court considered what circumstances are necessary to allow for the deposition of an
opposing party’s former attorney during discovery. The Court balanced the competing interests
of discovering vital information to a litigant’s case and the importance of the attorney-client
privilege.
Disposition/Outcome
The Court adopted the framework espoused by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Shelton v. American Motors Corp.2 Under the Shelton analysis, the party seeking to depose
opposing counsel must demonstrate that information sought cannot be obtained by other means,
is relevant and nonprivileged, and is crucial to the preparation of the case.3 The district court did
not apply the Shelton factors and the Court remanded the case back to the district court to
conduct an analysis based on those factors.
Factual and Procedural History
Petitioners Club Vista Financial Services, Gary Tharaldson, and Tharaldson Motels II,
Inc., entered into a real estate development project with respondents Scott Financial, Bradley J.
Scott, Bank of Oklahoma, Gemstone Development West, Inc., and Asphalt Products
Corporation. Respondents were lenders on a multimillion dollar loan guaranteed by petitioners.
When the loan went into default petitioners filed suit against respondents, alleging that
respondents had failed to ensure that certain pre-funding conditions were satisfied before they
advanced money on the loan. In their initial disclosures under NRCP 16.1, petitioners identified
their attorney, K. Layne Morrill, as a person who may have discoverable information.
Tharaldson and two of his employees denied having personal knowledge of factual
allegations underlying the complaint. Tharaldson did, however, indicate that his attorneys might
have such information. Respondents informed Morrill that they intended to take his deposition
regarding the factual basis for the allegations in the complaint. Respondents obtained a
deposition subpoena in Arizona for Morrill, which Morrill filed a motion to quash or for a
protective order preventing respondents from taking his deposition. In the meantime, petitioners
filed a supplementary disclosure under NRCP 16.1, stating that it did not believe that Morrill had
any discoverable information relevant to the suit. Shortly thereafter, the Arizona court granted
the motion filed by Morrill.
Morrill filed a motion in the Nevada district court for a protective order to preclude
respondents from taking his deposition. The discovery master recommended that the district
court deny the motion. On review, the district court upheld the discovery master’s
recommendations, noting that attorneys would be able to object to questions they believed to be
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privileged. The Court also concluded that dismissing the motion was appropriate because
respondents only intended to ask questions about factual issues. After a petition for writ of
mandamus was filed, other counsel was substituted for Morrill, no longer making him the
attorney of record for petitioners.
Discussion
Justice Cherry wrote for the unanimous Court. First, the Court examined the requirements
for granting a writ of relief. The Court can grant a writ of prohibition when the district court
proceedings are in excess of its jurisdiction.4 Further, writ relief is generally not available if the
petitioner has “a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”5 The Court
has discretion to grant writ relief.6 Petitioners bear the burden to demonstrate that relief is
warranted.7 Additionally, the Court stated that discovery matters are within the discretion of the
district court and that it would not disturb such a ruling unless the court had abused its
discretion.8 The Court determined that granting the writ of prohibition was appropriate because a
later appeal would not cure any improper disclosure of information. Therefore, the petitioners
did not have a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.
Next, the Court examined when it is appropriate to allow for the deposition of an
opposing party’s former attorney. The Court noted the different policies on either side of the
issue. They pointed out that requiring attorneys to participate in depositions may increase the
time and costs of litigation, create delays in the attorney’s work, distract the attorney from
representation of the client, and discourage clients from openly communicating with their
attorneys. The Court said, further, that courts across the country “have disfavored the practice of
taking the deposition of a party’s attorney.”9 However, the Court added that opposing counsel
should not have absolute immunity from being deposed, but that such depositions should only be
permitted under exceptionally limited circumstances.
To help determine when such depositions are appropriate, the Court turned to the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court of appeals outlined a three factor test. Under that test, in
order to take the deposition of an opposing party’s counsel the party seeking the deposition has
the burden of proving that “(1) no other means exist to obtain the information than to depose
opposing counsel; (2) the information sought is relevant and nonprivileged; and (3) the
information is crucial to the preparation of the case.”10 The Court further noted that the district
court should consider whether the attorney is a percipient witness to the facts giving rise to the
case.11 Finally, the Court added that when the facts allow for a party to depose opposing counsel,
the district court should provide specific limiting instructions in order to protect against improper
disclosure.

Conclusion
4

NEV. REV. STAT. § 34.320 (2007).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 34.330 (2007).
6
Smith v. Dist. Ct., 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991).
7
Pan v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004).
8
Matter of Adoption of Minor Child, 118 Nev. 962, 968, 60 P.3d 485, 489 (2002).
9
Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 491 (5th Cir. 1999).
10
Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir. 1986).
11
Kerr v. Able Sanitary, 684 A.2d 961, 967 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
5

Because the discovery master and district court failed to conduct their analysis based on
the Shelton factors, the Court granted the writ in part and directed the district court to reconsider
the motion in light of those factors. The Court denied the petition to the extent that it sought an
order compelling the district court to issue a protective order. Instead, the Court left the decision
to the discretion of the district court after conducting an analysis based on the Shelton factors.

